Why Major Foreign Funds Have Gone Quiet in India
Their retreat is not episodic or tactical; it reflects a deeper reset in global capital allocation, fund economics, and India’s late-stage opportunity structure.
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For much of the last decade, Tiger Global and SoftBank were synonymous with scale capital in India. They famously backed the rise of consumer internet champions, got behind aggressive growth strategies, and reshaped valuation benchmarks across fintech, edtech, mobility, and e-commerce.
Today, both firms are conspicuously absent from India’s deal flow. Their retreat is not episodic or tactical; it reflects a deeper reset in global capital allocation, fund economics, and India’s late-stage opportunity structure.
The shift is most visible in the data.
According to startup investment tracking platforms such as Tracxn and Venture Intelligence, Tiger Global’s India activity peaked in 2021, when it participated in more than 50 funding rounds and deployed over USD 2 billion in a single calendar year. By 2023, that number had fallen to single-digit deal participation, with most capital earmarked for follow-on support rather than new investments.
SoftBank’s pullback has been even starker. After deploying nearly USD 9 billion in India in 2021, its fresh investment activity dropped sharply in 2022 and went virtually dormant in 2023 and 2024, aside from selective internal restructurings within its existing portfolio.
The contraction mirrors a broader global venture capital retrenchment, but its intensity in India warrants closer examination.
The first driver is the post-2021 correction in global risk capital. Ultra-low interest rates during the pandemic years created an environment where growth was priced aggressively, and capital was abundant. Funds like Tiger Global, structured for rapid deployment at scale, thrived in that context. As global monetary policy tightened and public market valuations corrected, the arbitrage between private and public markets collapsed.
Tiger Global was also slapped by the Supreme Court of India to pay the capital gains on its 2018 sale of Flipkart India shares to Walmart. The Apex court overturned an earlier ruling from a lower court that allowed the firm to enjoy exemptions on the sale based on a tax treaty with Mauritius.
“This path-breaking ruling is likely to have far-reaching implications not only on capital gains taxability, but also on the larger issue of tax treaty entitlement of multinational companies earning any income from India,” said KPMG, commenting on the ruling.
This further complicates India’s already challenging exit environment. Despite a large startup base, the country has produced relatively few large, profitable, globally liquid exits in the last five years. IPO outcomes have been uneven, secondary liquidity remains shallow, and strategic M&A at scale is limited.
A second, more structural factor is the shrinking pool of late-stage opportunities that meet global fund thresholds. Data from IVCA and Bain indicate that while early-stage startup formation in India remains robust, the number of companies capable of absorbing USD 100 million-plus cheques at acceptable valuations has declined.
Many startups raised aggressively between 2019 and 2021 and are now focused on consolidation, profitability, or internal restructuring rather than expansion capital. For firms like Tiger Global and SoftBank, whose models are optimised for scale rounds, this reduces deployable areas for their funds.
Regulatory and tax considerations have also played a role. While not the primary driver, increased scrutiny around offshore structures, capital gains taxation, and retrospective interpretations has introduced additional complexity for global funds. The cumulative impact of these factors is visible at the ecosystem level. India’s total startup funding in 2024 fell to its lowest level in four years, according to aggregated private market databases.
Importantly, this is not a permanent withdrawal. Neither Tiger Global nor SoftBank has exited India as a market. What has changed is the engagement.
Deployment is now contingent on clearer paths to profitability, disciplined valuations, and credible exit visibility. Until those conditions align, global growth capital is likely to remain cautious.

For much of the last decade, Tiger Global and SoftBank were synonymous with scale capital in India. They famously backed the rise of consumer internet champions, got behind aggressive growth strategies, and reshaped valuation benchmarks across fintech, edtech, mobility, and e-commerce.
Today, both firms are conspicuously absent from India’s deal flow. Their retreat is not episodic or tactical; it reflects a deeper reset in global capital allocation, fund economics, and India’s late-stage opportunity structure.
The shift is most visible in the data.